The Federal Housing Administration in the New Millennium by Pennington-Cross, Anthony & Yezer, Anthony
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Finance Faculty Research and Publications Finance, Department of
1-1-2000
The Federal Housing Administration in the New
Millennium
Anthony Pennington-Cross
Marquette University, anthony.pennington-cross@marquette.edu
Anthony Yezer
George Washington University
Published version. Journal of Housing Research, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2000): 357-372. Publisher Link. ©
2000 American Real Estate Society. Used with permission.
Anthony Pennington-Cross was affiliated with the Research Institute for Housing America at the
time of publication.
Journal ofHousing Research • Volume 11, Issue 2 357 
© Fannie Mae Foundation 2000. All Rights Reserved. 
The Federal Housing Administration 
in the New Millennium 
Anthony Pennington-Cross and Anthony M. Yezer* 
Abstract 
The first challenge in attempting to predict the future of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) is 
to understand why it is still here. No other depression-era mortgage-market institution has survived 
without substantial modification. We conclude that its survival has depended on its ability to invent 
new purposes for itself. For example, it changed from a replacement for failed prívate mortgage insur-
ance using economic soundness asan insurance criterion toan innovator in high-risk lending based on 
an acceptable risk criterion. FHA has developed special programs to serve the needs of specific groups. 
We believe this pattern of change in purposes also is the key to FHA survival in the new millennium. 
We review potential future purposes for FHA and find that several-particularly, maintaining mort-
gage credit flows in declining regional housing markets-will require a substantial FHA presence in 
mortgage markets. This is important because it implies that a marginalized FHA cannot serve severa! 
of the important purposes that it is likely to be asked to serve in the new millennium. Accordingly, we 
believe that FHA market share will be maintained and perhaps expanded in the new millennium, even 
with increasing competition from conventionallending. 
Keywords: Federal Housing Administration; Housing policy; Mortgage credit 
Introduction 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance was e~tablished in the Housing 
Act of 1934 as one of a triad of federal initiatives in the housing finance market. Since that 
time, it has experienced periods both of great success and failure. Its outstanding character-
istic has been its resilience, a tribute to the willingness of apparently high-risk borrowers 
with little equity to repay their mortgages. Most recently, it has survived substantial efforts 
at reorganization and reinvention in spite of a fairly dismal fiscal performance. 
This article considers the reasons for the programmatic stability of FHA while other hous-
ing programs have experienced substantial changes in their roles in both the real and the 
financia! sides ofthe housing market. The stability ofFHA contrasts with change in the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank System, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and a plethora of supply-side hous-
ing programs. Furthermore, the private sector with which FHA interacts and competes has 
changed substantially over time, particularly with the resurrection of private mortgage in-
surance (PMI). At its inception, FHA was conceived as a program to fill an incomplete mar-
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ket-that is, to complement rather than compete with the private sector. Today, it is clear that 
FHA competes with conventionallenders and that this is a major problem for its contiriued 
growth in the new millennium. Based on a historical analysis ofFHA, we argue that its sta-
bility is dueto an ability to reinvent new purposes for its basic product, high-risk mortgage 
insurance. Will FHA continue to reinvent its purposes so that it stays ahead of those who 
question its relevance? Ifit does reinvent its purpose, what does this imply for its organiza-
tion and operation? Can it succeed without competing significantly with conventional mort-
gage lending? 
This article addresses these difficult questions first by reviewing the history of FHA. Then, 
a framework for discussing alternative purposes is developed, a laundry list of purposes is 
considered, and the ability of FHA to adopt them successfully is analyzed. For the most part, 
the discussion presented here is positive rather than normative. A model of FHA innovation 
and development is advanced to consider what is likely to happen within a framework con-
sistent with lessons from FHA history. Inevitably, sorne normative content enters beca use of 
our inability to discuss what FHA has done and might do without commenting on how well 
it is likely to perform and whether the net benefit is likely to exceed zero. 
Brief History of FHA's Changing Purposes 
This historical perspective is designed to emphasize FHA's process of adopting new purposes 
and taking new initiatives, the reaction ofmarkets to those initiatives, and the implications 
ofthose market reactions for FHA. The general patterns are not surprising. New FHA pur-
poses that generate initiatives producing revenues in excess of costs tend to provoke priva te 
imitation that limits the size of the FHA program. In contrast, initiatives that require· sub-
sidies tend to experience increasing subsidy over time, and this, in turn, limits program 
expansion and may even cause the program to be retracted or substantially reVised. 
Prior to the Great Depression, there was very little federal intervention in or supervision 
of mortgage lending transactions, which were viewed essentially as local in· character. That 
changed dramatically with the failure of the PMI industry under the weight of a default rate 
approaching 50 percent and foreclosures exceeding 1,000 per day in 1933. From this emer-
gency, FHA was born. lts purpose was dictated by the failure of priva te mortgage markets. 
There was no reason to assume that such a birth would result in the longevity that we have 
observed. The Federal Home Loan Bank System (1932), Fannie Mae (1938), and the Home-
owner's Loan Corporation (1933) are examples of sister organizations that had significant 
success but eventually saw substantial modification (the first two) or elimination (the latter). 
The original purpose of FHA as part of the economic recovery program was to restare mort-
gage lending-and fill the gap created by the failure of priva te mortgage insurance. This should 
not have sustained it for long. 
One of the first examples of new purposes that resulted in innovations by FHA occurred dur-
ing the 1940s with programs supporting the war and, la ter, veterans' housing. These were sub-
sequently taken over by the Veterans Administration (now the U.S. Department ofVeterans 
Affairs). This is a notable example of an FHA innovation that was transferred to another 
agency. While unimportant in terms of economic significance, this example may have been 
significant to policy makers, leading to a steady stream of new purposes and innovations in 
the two postwar decades. 
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The assignment of FHA to the Housing and Home Finance Agency in 1949 signaled the addi-
tion ofnew purposes. As noted in Barth, Cordes, and Yezer (1983), and Vandell (1995), FHA 
transformed itself from an emergency stopgap to a successful innovator, insuring mortgages 
with lower down payments, higher payment-to-income ratios (PTis), and longer terms to 
maturity than had been observed in the predepression era. This FHA innovation was so suc-
cessful that conventional lenders began to imitate terms of FHA-insured mortgages. The 
surpluses in FHA's principal insurance fund, the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMIF), 
weakened the arguments of those who considered mortgages an uninsurable risk, and PMI 
was again legalized. PMI began to compete with FHA insurance. This may be an example of 
an overly successful FHA demonstration, since it led to a presumption that mortgage default 
is an insurable risk. 
As concern with inner-city housing rose in the 1950s and 1960s, the 1954 Housing Act changed 
the economic soundness criterion guiding the MMIF to one of acceptable risk. This was a de-
parture from the previous position that FHA insurance was to substitute for failed PMI. By 
the mid-1950s, there was a widespread perception that consumption of adequate, owner-
occupied housing generated externalities and that it should be subsidized. One form for that 
subsidy was mortgage financing. Under its initial interpretation, however, the acceptable risk 
criterion certainly involved little subsidy. It was thought that, by increasmg the maximum 
loan amount, the share of low-risk mortgages could be increased to compensa te for MMIF's 
tendency to increasingly lend with more generous terms to lower-income borrowers. 
The fiscal soundness of the MMIF led to the perception that FHA insurance could support 
virtually any aspect of housing policy. The 1950s and 1960s were a golden era in which new 
purposes, in the form ofnarrowly targeted programs, were heaped upon FHA. When urban 
blight became an issue, and urban renewal was seen as the answer, FHA was given a new 
purpose: to facilitate both relocation of residents and resettlement of new residents. Subse-
quently, special programs for cooperatives, condominiums, nursing homes, and home improve-
ment were added to FHA's portfolio. The purpose ofFHA was extended beyond specific hous-
ing and community development policy to support for piecemeal housing programs being gen-
erated by a hyperactive political process. These programs initially had separate insurance 
funds that later were combined into the Veterans Housing Benefit Program Fund (GI Fund). 
Given the economic environment of the 1950s, they appeared financially successful, and 
FHA seemed able to deal successfully with its new multipurpose status. But the success of 
the insurance fund over the short run does not demonstrate long-run viability ofmortgage in-
surance under a full range of economic circumstances. This characteristic of mortgage insur-
ance makes it particularly vulnerable to a political process in which short time horizons tend 
to anoint immediate success and disregard the possibility of longer-term failure. This mis-
match of time horizon appears to have led to additional purposes being imposed on FHA 
during the 1950s. 
The 1960s saw FHA mortgage insurance increasingly combined with other housing programs 
as the new U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) sought to achieve · 
visible results. FHA was to serve the HUD purpose of extending homeownership to an in-
creasing proportion of Americans. This should not be confused with the initial purpose of sub-
stituting for a failed PMI industry. For example, the practice of assessing neighborhood con-
dition as a part of the economic soundness criterion was condemned by critics as a code for 
redlining. The acceptable risk criterion allowed underwriters to disregard neighborhood condi-
tion beyond its effect on the appraised value of the property. The new FHA approach quickly 
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evolved into the notion of geographically invariant underwriting criteria that ignore local 
economic conditions. This was a significant development, and geographic invariance contin-
ues to be an important aspect ofFHA mortgage insurance. 
By the late 1960s, supply-side housing policy had identified capital subsidies, usually below 
market interest rate financing, as a . major tool for either extending homeownership or sub-
sidizing multifamily units. FHA's purpose in this was to insure these financia! instruments. 
Recognizing that these efforts could produce future los ses, most of these new programs were 
financed under the Special Risk Insurance Fund (SRIF). This may well be the point at which 
FHA moved furthest away from its initial purpose. Certainly, the underwriting criteria that 
characterized insurance written under the N ational Housing Act's Section 235 homeowner-
ship program were far removed from earlier standards, and the FHA property inspection was 
compromised in support ofincreasing homeownership. Perhaps in recognition ofthe change 
in focus, FHA was integrated into HUD far more completely, with separate support divisions, 
such as personnel, procurement, and computer systems, eliminated. At the same time, priva-
tization of Fannie Mae and creation of the Government N ational Mortgage Association tended 
to move the focus of FHA further into HUD and created new and powerful competition in the 
private sector. 
The large number of economically unsound mortgages insured in support of Sections 235 and 
236led toa quick retreat in high-risk FHA insurance activity by 1973 and to accusations of 
fraud and abuse in FHA programs. During this period, the relation between mortgage· credit 
and neighborhood quality, once assumed to be monotonic increasing, was questioned. The 
phrase "FHA-ing a neighborhood" carne to mean making large numbers ofunsound mortgages 
in an area, followed by an inevitable round of default, foreclosure, and deterioration of the 
housing stock. High-risk mortgage insurance was seen as capable of producing negative as 
well as positive neighborhood externalities. 
The 1980s saw a change of purpose for the MMIF. Given the problems found in the very high-
risk lending that had characterized the SRIF, the Housing and Community Development Act 
of 1981 established targets for low-income borrowers. Combined with increasing conven-
tional competition, this produced a substantial rise in the percentage of high loan-to-value 
ratio (LTV) lending. Lax underwriting standards and geographically concentrated housing 
market slumps combined to leave the MMIF with a balance ofless than 1 percent ofthe insur-
ance in force. FHA cut processing time and cost by introducing direct endorsement, but con-
trol of fraud and abuse was an issue because few lenders were sanctioned for having high 
loss rates. The combined purposes of expanding homeownership and maintaining credit sup-
ply in declining markets proved to be too much for the MMIF. 
Given the condition of the MMIF, FHA's major purpose during the 1990s was to restore the 
capitalization of this fund and to limit subsidies needed to continue the GI Fund and SRIF. 
In spite ofincreased competition from conventionallenders, prompted by affordable housing 
goals set for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FHA was able to accomplish its major purpose by 
raising premiums and adapting mortgage limits to local area housing costs. FHA cut costs by 
collapsing 81 field offices into 4 homeownership centers. Although FHA suffered sorne loss in 
market share beca use of increased premiums, these changes, combined with a robust econo-
my, have restored the economic soundness of the MMIF. However, table 1 reveals that the gap 
in 90-day delinquencies between FHA and conventionalloans continued to grow throughout 
the 1990s. More recently, premium cuts and further increases in maximum mortgage amount, 
Year 
1986 
1988 
1990 
1992 
1994 
1996 
1998 
1999 
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Table l. Comparison of 90-Day Delinquency Rates 
FHA 
1.29 
1.14 
1.10 
1.35 
1.44 
1.40 
1.51 
1.51 
Conventional 
0.67 
0.54 
0.39 
0.47 
0.45 
0.32 
0.28 
0.29 
Difference 
0.62 
0.60 
0 .71 
0.88 
0.99 
1.08 
1.23 
1.22 
Source: U.S. Housing Market Conditions (2000). 
to $219,849 in high-cost areas, promise to restare lost FHA volume, while increased vigi-
lance should reduce problems with direct endorsement. All of this was accomplished with 
moderate structural change in FHA, ignoring calls from politicians for substantial restruc-
turing or even elimination. 
Based on this historical record, we conclude that FHA has successfully survived the seri-
ous problems of the 1990s and should have little difficulty maintaining itself in the new 
millenni um. 
Normative Framework for Evaluating FHA's Changing Purposes 
The purpose of this section is to establish a framework for making norma ti ve statements re-
garding FHA's role within mortgage markets. Essentially, we want to establish when and why 
we should care about the future purpose ofFHA, drawing both on welfare economics and the 
considerable record of achievement by FHA. This effort is similar to previous work by Aaron 
(1972), Retsinas (1995), and Vandell (1995), although our conclusions differ significantly. 
This discussion concentrates first on single-family mortgage insurance because of the cen-
tral importance of the homeownership purpose in one form or another throughout FHA his-
tory. We then consider multifamily and special situations issues. 
Uninsurable Risk 
The beginning point ofwelfare analysis is market failure in the single-family mortgage market, 
evidenced in the historie failure ofPMI in 1933. Unfortunately, there is controversy over this 
initial point. Foster and Herzog (1981) argued strongly that mortgage insurance involves an 
uninsurable risk beca use mortgage credit risk is based on the business cycle as well as risks 
arising from govemment housing policy. Follain and Szymanoski (1995) made a similar point 
regarding FHA's potential role in multifamily mortgage markets. Given that the collateral 
for mortgage loans is largely real esta te, fluctuations in value beca use of business cycles or 
changes in govemment policy, such as the tax expenditure for owner-occupied housing, could 
impose huge losses on the industry. lt is unlikely that the current PMI industry could sur-
vive 1933-level default rates approaching 50 percent. Should PMI fail, the implications for 
govemment-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), which likely have "too big to fail" protection, and 
depositories with their government-guaranteed deposit liabilities, would be substantial costs 
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to the Treasury. We designate as the "uninsurable risk" purpose that rationale for government 
provision of mortgage insurance to deal with market failures based on catastrophic loss. As 
previously noted, there may be controversy over this point, beca use sorne observers may claim 
that PMI can pass stress tests that consider alllikely catastrophic events. 
Regional Stabilization 
FHA's failure to consider local housing market conditions has been shown by Ambrose, Pen-
nington-Cross, and Yezer (2000) to result in a rising share of applications and endorsements 
in either areas experiencing current downtums or those where the variance in housing price 
change is higher. This is not surprising, given previous work by Duca and Rosenthal (1991) and 
the demonstration by Canner and Passmore (1995) and Canner, Passmore, and Mittal (1994) 
that showed that PMI does not penetrate far into the higher-risk mortgage market. What is 
the market failure that is linked to this behavior? Consider what happens if conventional 
lenders require lower LTVs and PTis in areas experiencing falling wages and rising unem-
ployment. The housing market response should be lower housing prices that result in lower 
loan amounts and monthly payments. But falling house prices will cause lenders to further 
lower required LTVs and PTis. Clearly, the potential for mortgage underwriting criteria to 
con tribute to instability in housing markets is present. While there · is no firm evidence on 
this point, Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1997) have recently argued that mortgage under~ 
writing criteria may contribute to regional cycles, and Ambrose, Pennington-Cross, and 
Yezer (2000) have demonstrated that FHA market shares of applications and endorsements 
move as predicted by this theory. FHA's "regional stabilization" purpose is exemplified in its 
role to attenuate housing market slumps by serving as lender oflast resort in declining areas. 
lnformation Externalities in Mortgage Scoring Schemes 
Credit scoring and automated underwriting, which we will term mortgage scoring, have be-
come important aids to the mortgage underwriting process. FHA loss data have been used in 
studjes of high-risk lending. For example, FHA data were used in classic studies of default 
loss by von Furstenberg (1969) and subsequently by Barth, Cardes, and Yezer (1980) and 
Berkovec and Gabriel (1995). A number of interesting features of mortgage scoring suggest 
problems with priva te market provision of credit risk models. First, estimating the statistical 
models underlying mortgage scoring requires that the econometrician deal with problems of 
sample selection; for instance, losses cannot be observed on mortgage applications that were 
rejected. This problem is so serious that credit card companies sometimes give cards to all 
applicants (sorne with small credit limits) so that they can observe failure rates for the popu-
lation. Note that a firm or organization with a relatively high-risk portfolio is likely to suffer 
least from this type of selection problem. Second, mortgage scoring schemes must be kept 
secret. Revelation of the formulas used to score applications invalidates the models them-
selves, beca use they are estimated using data from unknowing applicants. If scoring schemes 
are made public, another form of sample selection must be confronted-that involving the deci-
sion to apply. Third, there are substantial economies of scale in producing mortgage scoring 
schemes: precision improves with sample size, and one model can be used for very large num-
bers of applications. 
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One important aspect of credit scoring schemes is the effect ofloan terms on credit risk. This 
is particularly acute when new mortgage products are considered because there is a very sub-
stantial initial cost of creating and testing the new product. Priva te mortgage lenders are un-
derstandably reluctant to incur these costs beca use they cannot be recovered if the product 
proves to have unacceptably high credit risk. Also, ifthe product has acceptable loss experi-
ence, rivals will quickly produce their own version because exclusion is impossible, and com-
pete away any return from innovation. 
Once a mortgage scoring scheme is produced, the cost of disseminating it to underwriters is 
approximately zero. This creates a classic information-pricing problem, because the marginal 
cost ofproviding scoring systems is zero while the average cost for high-quality systems is sub-
stantial. We conclude that private markets are likely both to allocate too few resources to 
mortgage scoring and to price above marginal cost. FHA has a potential for using its infor-
mation on default loss experience to increase resources available for creating mortgage scor-
ing schemes, here termed its "information production" purpose. 
Lending Discrimination 
Closely related to, yet distinct from, the information purpose argument is the problem created 
by the possibility of discrimination in mortgage lending. The strongest argument for market 
failure in this area, as noted by Ferguson and Peters (1995) among others, is that illegal sta-
tistical discrimination may be consistent with profit maximization. Given the high cost of 
mortgage screening schemes that render personal characteristics of applicants insignificant, 
to the extent that easily observed personal characteristics are highly correlated with credit 
risk, there is an economic incentive to use the predictive power of these personal character-
istics in lending decisions. Thus, because of the cost of collecting information needed to 
assess credit risk, there is a rationale for believing that illegal statistical discrimination is 
consistent with profit maximization. Because it is essential to keep mortgage screening cri-
teria secret, and beca use of the association between personal characteristics and credit risk, 
it is difficult for applicants, lenders, and regulators to determine the extent to which market 
failure based on lending discrimination has occurred. By removing incentives for discrimina-
tion from its own programs, FHA provides an alternative source ofmortgage credit for minori-
ties fearing discrimination. To the extent that minorities flee to a nondiscriminating sector 
when they perceive possible discrimination, the FHA share of minority lending can poten-
tially serve an antidiscrimination purpose. A number of studies have established the stylized 
fact that minority participation in FHA programs is unusually high, controlling for observable 
financia! characteristics of the loan transaction. This suggests an important role for FHA in 
encouraging minority homeownership. 
Housing Consumption Externalities 
Private decisions to consume poor-quality housing may have externalities for neighborhoods 
(Rohe, McCarthy, and Van Zandt 2000). Again, the precise nature and magnitude of these 
effects is beyond the scope of this article. Many of the housing programs that FHA has been 
called on to support were designed to raise housing consumption above a threshold where 
housing externalities were eliminated. Sorne of the housing programs were subsequently 
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found to be ineffective. In most cases, these problems had little to do with FHA. One excep-
tion is low-income homeownership programs such as the National Housing Act's Section 
235, for which Benston (1995) and Vandell (1995) both have noted that lax underwriting and 
property inspection efforts resulted in substantial default, foreclosure, and abandonment. 
Nevertheless, FHA potentially has a purpose to increase housing consumption. 
Homeownership Externalities 
The presumption that homeownership, as opposed to housing consumption, has positive exter-
nalities for neighborhoods has been a major force in housing policy. Holding everything else 
constant, tenure status is said to produce externa! benefits beca use owners have greater inter-
est in promoting community welfare. This is not the place to review evidence for and against 
this presumption, but important issues regarding the likely relation between FHA mortgage 
insurance and homeownership remain unresolved. A significant literature, including Haurin, 
Hendershott, and Wachter (1996, 1997) and Linneman and Wachter (1989), has established 
that down payment requirements rather than PTis are the major impediment to homeown-
ership, and FHA's low down payments have attracted a disproportionate share of applica-
tions from first-time home buyers. At the same time, Fortín (1996), Goodman and Nichols 
(1997), Kohlhase (1986), and Krumm and Kelly (1989) have provided evidence that house-
holds adjust work and savings behavior in anticipation ofunderwriting requirements. These 
results suggest that being able to borrow under FHA's high LTV s tends to accelerate home-
ownership among households who eventually would have purchased homes. Therefore, 
FHA's role in dealing with the homeownership externality may be modest in fact. Note the 
contradiction between efforts to advance the housing consumption purpose by lowering 
rents and efforts to advance the homeownership purpose. Thus far, this contradiction has 
not proved to be an impediment to popular policy debates that champion FHA's role in 
advancing both purposes. In this case, the future of FHA may depend on misperception of 
economic effects. 
Income Distribution 
One of the arguments for housing policies has been to modify the expected income distribu-
tion. While FHA serves relatively low-income home buyers, this group is not generally poor, as 
observed by MacRae, Turner, and Yezer (1982) and Plaut (1985). lt is much more likely that 
FHA programs in support oflow-income multifamily housing entering the SRIF can be ratio-
nalized as signi:ficantly redistributive. Overall, the redistributive purpose of FHA does not 
appear to be important. 
Two Caveats Regarding FH!fs Ability to Achieve Its Purposes 
In normative analysis ofFHA's purpose, it is important to move beyond the observation ofpo-
tential or even apparent failure of priva te market forces to achieve an optimum. At least two 
other criteria are needed to justify an FHA purpose in terms of welfare economics. The first 
is logical consistency ofprograms. For example, the FHA purpose oflowering the cost oflow-
income rental housing may help to address the income distribution issues and housing exter-
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nalities characterizing private market solutions. However, FHA programs that lower rental 
costs also lower the relative cost of renting compared with owning and hence increase the 
homeownership extemality problem. Another example arises because housing affordability 
problems are generally most acute in areas where housing prices have been rising signifi-
cantly. This creates a tension between FHA programs directed at helping owners and pro-
grams (such as those of the regional stabilization and income distribution purposes) 
designed for helping areas where housing prices are declining. 
The second criterion is that, in order for FHA to address a potential market failure, it must be 
able to direct its efforts toward solution of that problem without affecting resource allocation 
in areas where there is no market failure. Given the history of FHA, there is a substantial 
record on which to base judgments about the effectiveness of its programs in targeting prob-
lems of market failure. Thus far, successful targeting appears confined to the homeowner-
ship externality. FHA's role in regional stabilization has largely arisen accidentally as it pas-
sively accepted the adverse selection inherent in failing to consider local housing market 
trends. It has taken little or no proactive role in dealing with information or discrimination. 
Accordingly, it appears that sorne of the cases of potential market failure previously dis-
cussed may not be a rationale for FHA remedies because there is little evidence that FHA 
has addressed these issues appropriately in the past. 
This welfare analysis has departed from previous views of possible roles for FHA, both in 
the range of possible market failures considered and in the emphasis on both inconsistencies 
among roles and the likely ability of FHA to respond in a welfare-enhancing manner, given 
its history of operation. 
Can FHA Fulfill Purposes without Competing with Conventional Lending? 
Part ofthe conventional rationale for FHA is that it should complement but not compete with 
conventional mortgage lending and that it is to experiment with high-risk mortgage prod-
ucts. One remarkable aspect of FHA is that this rhetoric about its relation to conventional 
lending has persisted over time in spite of overwhelming evidence that it is not true and that 
FHA could not function ifit were true. We consider these two points in tum. First, a number 
of studies, including Ambrose, Pennington-Cross, and Yezer (2000) and Canner and Passmore 
(1995), have found substantial overlap between the households served by FHA and conven-
tional lenders. In sorne geographic areas, FHA's substantial market share indicates that it 
is seen as a good substitute for conventionallending. This is illustrated in table 2, which pre-
sents tabulations of spatial variation across and within states by metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) in the FHA share of FHA-eligible (under the maximum mortgage amount applying in 
that area) mortgage originations based on Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data for 1995 and 
1996. Clearly, this variation is far larger than could be explained by differences in the per-
centage of high-risk applicants across locations. 
Second, and even more important than actual competition between FHA and conventional 
lenders, is the necessity for FHA to compete with conventionallenders ifit is to carry out most 
of the purposes discussed earlier in this section. For example, the uninsurable risk and region-
al stabilization purposes require that FHA have a substantial presence in mortgage markets 
across the country. If there is a sudden economic downtum in an area, it is unreasonable to 
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Table 2. FilA Share of FHA-Eligible Originations 
by State and MSA (Percent) 
Sta te 
Alabama 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Missouri 
Montana 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
NewYork 
N orth Carolina 
Average 
MSA 
18.4 
30.0 
33.2 
29.3 
31.7 
27.7 
24.3 
22.9 
23.6 
14.7 
18.3 
15.2 
22.8 
25.0 
30.7 
19.3 
44.2 
24.6 
22.4 
16.0 
23.9 
14.7 
Lowest 
MSA 
6.1 
23.3 
19.2 
0.7 
19.3 
22.6 
20.6 
9.3 
14.8 
5.8 
2.9 
4.6 
6.5 
13.7 
6.7 
6.0 
37.2 
23.2 
10.3 
2.8 
7.0 
2.6 
Source: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 1995 and 1996 data sets. 
Highest 
MSA 
35.5 
39.7 
40.0 
62.0 
43.7 
31.0 
28.9 
34.7 
31.1 
26.3 
38.6 
24.8 
37.8 
35.9 
51.9 
34.8 
51.3 
26.0 
48.4 
29.9 
38.6 
25.1 
Note: Market shares are calculated for loans under the FHA loan limit applicable in 
each MSA. 
expect FHA to function as a last resort source of mortgage insurance on a substantial vol-
ume ofbusiness ifits initial market presence is very small. Similarly, the antidiscrimination 
purpose requires that FHA have a sufficient presence to be seen as an attractive alternative 
by minorities and the agents that serve them. Less obvious is the need for FHA to lend toa 
range of risk levels if it is to be used as the basis for credit scoring schemes. Inevitably, FHA 
lending experience suffers from selection bias because of its failure to lend to the highest 
risks. However, ifFHA did not compete with conventionallenders, it would select from a very 
narrow range of credit risk, and making inferences about credit risk from its data would be 
very difficult beca use of selection bias at both the high- and low-risk ends. 
FHA has not avoided competition with conventionallending in the past and cannot do so in 
the future if it is to carry out purposes for which there is sorne normative rationale. What may 
be different about the future is that high-risk conventionallending may make the contra-
diction between the rhetoric of noncompetition and the reality of competition more difficult 
to maintain, and this could affect FHA in the new millennium. 
FHA's Purposes for the New Millennium 
Based on historical analysis, we have hypothesized that FHA's ability to survive relatively in-
tact arises from its ability to adapt to new purposes. In this section, we consider a variety of 
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purposes for FHA in the new millennium. Sorne ofthem are continuations ofthe current ratio-
nale for FHA, others resurrect old purposes, and a third group appears to be new. In each 
case, we discuss the purpose briefly, comment on its implications for FHA programs, and con-
sider the welfare implications ofpursuit ofthat purpose in light ofthe discussion in the pre-
vious section. The discussion is framed in the context ofthe changing private sector mortgage 
market. 
Promotion of Homeownership 
The primary program promoting homeownership is Section 203(b) mortgage insurance backed 
by the MMIF. As previously noted, reserves in this program now appear to be adequate. In-
deed, FHA currently estima tes a positive net worth of $16 billion for the MMIF. Higher max-
imum loan amounts and lower premiums promise to grow this program. Major questions on 
the ability of FHA to promote homeownership relate to increasing competition from PMI, 
which has lowered its down payments to approximate the FHA limits. 
In evaluating the effects of FHA programs on homeow:riership, one also must consider the 
substantialliterature, including Follain (1990), Hendershott, LaFayette, and Haurin (1997), 
and Leece (1995), suggesting that low-down payment mortgages tend to allow households 
who are expected eventual owners to huy at a younger age. Goodman and. Nichols (1997) 
have demonstrated that households facing down payment and monthly payment ratios raise 
earnings and increase savings to qualify for mortgages. Taken together, these arguments 
suggest that FHA may have a greatly reduced role in promoting homeownership in the new 
millennium as conventionalloans overcome the 95 percent LTV barrier. One contrary find-
ing is the observation by Ambrose, Pennington-Cross, and Yezer (2000, table 2) that the FHA 
share is remarkably high in sorne cities compared with expectations. This suggests a partic-
ular brand loyalty to FHA mortgage insurance in selected cities. We conclude that promoting 
homeownership, particularly among younger first-time home buyers, will be a major pur-
pose of FHA in the new millennium. Based on the discussion in the previous section of this 
article, any welfare gains from these attempts to raise homeownership rates are likely to be 
quite small. 
Reinsurance for PMI 
Given the increasing market share ofPMI and the perception that the industry could not sur-
vive a major decline in housing prices, the new millennium could see the purpose of FHA 
extended to providing reinsurance for the private sector. Vandell (1995) provides a thought-
ful discussion of the institutional circumstances under which such a reinsurance arrange-
ment might come about. Although the previous section discussed substantial welfare argu-
ments in favor of a reinsurance purpose, it seems unlikely that this venture will be pursued 
unless there is a period of major losses to insurance funds. Of course, under such circum-
stances, the MMIF also would likely require subsidy, and political reaction to taking on an 
additional reinsurance purpose might not be favorable. Similar political difficulties have 
confronted attempts to establish reinsurance funds for catastrophic earthquake damage. 
Curiously, the lack of an arrangement in the earthquake insurance market may have seri-
ous implications for mortgage insurance markets, because uninsured disaster events may, if 
large enough, trigger serious mortgage insurance problems. 
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Production of Mortgage Scoring Schemes 
Welfare analysis suggests that private market provision ofmortgage scoring schemes suffers 
from classic efficiency problems associated with the economics of information, large fixed cost 
of development, and zero marginal cost of dissemination. Bunce et al. (1995) have described 
FHA attempts to develop a mortgage scoring scheme that is calibrated on its own loan file. 
This is perhaps the first step in FHA's establishing an important new purpose. However, it 
faces several challenges. First, FHA does not collect or retain detailed information on rejected 
or withdrawn applications. This is essential if mortgage scoring models are to deal properly 
with selection bias. Second, a stable protocol for dealing with delinquency, default, and fore-
closure must be implemented if default loss estimates are to be meaningful. Third, FHA is 
in a position to consider experimental relaxation ofunderwriting standards to determine con-
sequences for losses. Fourth, FHA must become comfortable with the primary assumption 
under which mortgage scoring schemes are estimated; that is, that the applicants do not 
know details of the scoring formula. It is likely that the new millennium will see sorne period 
in which FHA attempts to leap forward into a position oftechnologicalleadership and produc-
tion of mortgage scoring schemes becomes a central purpose. 
For the research community, this would be good news. While the details ofmortgage scoring 
schemes must be confidential, the improved FHA data needed to estímate these models would 
certainly aid researchers. 
Elimination of Lending Discrimination 
One might imagine that the availability of FHA insurance would guarantee that demograph-
ic characteristics would play no role in mortgage availability for those seeking mortgages 
under the maximum mortgage amount. IfFHA functions as a nondiscriminating supplier, any 
group experiencing real or apparent discrimination in conventionallending should apply for 
FHA-insured mortgages. In a test that assumes FHA functions as a classic nondiscriminat-
ing supplier, Shear and Yezer (1983) use the relation between FHA market shares and demo-
graphic characteristics asan indicator ofpossible discrimination in local mortgage markets. 
At a slightly higher level of sophistication, if FHA is a nondiscriminator, while conventional 
mortgages discrimina te (or are perceived to), it follows that the better risks among those dis-
criminated against will select FHA, either directly or after rejection for conventional mort-
gages. Barth, Cordes, and Yezer (1980) and Berkovec and Gabriel (1995) have used this prin-
cipie to test for discrimination by conventionallenders. They estímate default and default loss 
equations to intrinsically determine the relation between demographic characteristics of the 
borrower and credit risk. 
Overall, there are two purposes that FHA can serve to advance the goal of nondiscrimination 
in mortgage lending. There is a direct role in which demographic characteristics of the borrower 
are eliminated from the underwriting process. There is also an indirect role in which FHA 
data are used to test for discrimination in conventionallending. lt is seen in the classic eco-
nomics of discrimination results that predict that groups discriminated against will flock to 
the nondiscriminating sector, thus affecting both the volume and quality of applicants to that 
sector. Thus far, the first role has received sorne attention from FHA, but most statistical 
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analysis related to the second role has been conducted outside HUD. We believe this will 
change in the new millennium and that both potential roles for FHA in preventing discrim-
ination in mortgage lending will be realized. Note that there is a relation between the sec-
ond role of testing for discrimination here and the previous discussion of FHA's potential 
new roles in mortgage scoring. 
Income Redistribution 
Our historical review of FHA programs suggests that its addition of a modest redistributive 
purpose by switching from a lending criterion based on economic soundness to a criterion of 
acceptable risk was a success. Certainly, the innovative lending made possible by this switch 
in criteria provided important insights into measurement of credit risk. However, the cross sub-
sidy in the Section 203(b) program was achieved ata time when FHA faced relatively little 
competition. More recently, the MMIF has been under significant pressure, and FHA programs 
involving explicit subsidies that are secured by the SRIF ha ve been the focus of substantial 
criticism. As Weicher (1995) has observed, multifamily mortgage insurance has absorbed a 
substantial fraction of all FHA personnel resources without much evidence. of success. Yet, 
subsidized multifamily mortgage insurance is likely the major program through which FHA 
can lower the GINI ratio (the fraction of minority households that would have to move to 
create perfect racial integration) for the United States. Accordingly, it does not appear that 
FHA will be given the resources to achieve a significant income redistribution purpose in the 
new millennium. This does not mean that FHA will be perceived as having no important redis-
tributive purpose. Beca use FHA differentially serves a lower, but not the lowest, income group, 
it may be perceived as performing an important redistributive function within the population 
of home buyers. 
Elimination of Low-Quality Housing 
FHA programs ha ve been part of a supply-side strategy to improve housing quality and pre-
sumably reduce the externalities associated with low-quality housing. The FHA property in-
spection once was an important guarantor of structural soundness. In an attempt to increase 
homeownership during the 1960s, the inspection was compromised. Is it preferable for a house-
hold to own housing oflow quality or rent housing ofhigher quality? There may be a tension 
between the homeownership and housing quality purposes. A second tension between the 
homeownership and housing quality purposes arises when high-risk lending results in 
delinquency, default, and foreclosure. Under these circumstances, there may be substantial 
moral hazard for the condition of the physical unit. Borrowers ha ve little incentive to main-
tain and may even be looting a unit that they are unlikely to retain-particularly given FHNs 
policy of not pursuing deficiency judgments against defaulting borrowers. Observers as diverse 
as Benston (1995) and Bradford and Cincotta ( 1992) ha ve noted that high-risk lending car-
ries its own hazards for the condition ofthe housing stock and neighborhood amenity. It is very 
difficult to gauge the importance ofraising quality as a future purpose ofFHA. For political 
purposes, this must be mentioned as a goal, but the reality is that the relation between FHA 
programs and housing quality is complex and problematic. 
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Targeting of Programs to Specific Groups 
Since the 1940s, FHA has had programs targeted to housing finance needs of specific groups: 
veterans, residents of urban renewal areas, service personnel, residents impacted by military 
bases, and residents of rehabilitation projects. The sheer number of programs enacted sug-
gests that the ability to support such efforts appears to be a politically attractive feature of 
FHA. Furthermore, there is ample evidence that lending innovations begun by FHA are often 
emulated by conventionallenders. Most recently, this appears to be the case with FHA's pol-
icy ofmaking its scorecard a "glass box." In spite of conceptual difficulties in maintaining the 
integrity of a credit scoring scheme when its components are known, conventional lenders 
appear to be following FHA's lead. It is difficult to anticipate the future purposes. Currently, 
it appears that subprime lending is getting substantial attention. FHA could certainly devel-
op programs for refinancing mortgages held by people who have significant home equity but 
high PTis andlor low credit scores. These programs could then serve to demonstrate the 
dimensions of credit risk inherent in such lending. 
Conclusion 
The FHA has a remarkable history of innovation, both in terms of new mortgage products 
and purposes that it is said to serve. These two dimensions of change have been responsible 
for FHA's survival during a period in which other institutions of the mortgage market either 
have been eliminated or have undergone very substantial organizational change. However, 
the pace of change in mortgage markets has been accelerating. The time between a successful 
FHA innovation and imitation by conventionallenders has shortened considerably. This means 
that FHA will face continuing challenges to its status as an important supplement to the pri-
vate market. We have identified severa! purposes that likely will be central to the rationale 
for FHA in the new millennium. It is important that sorne of these purposes, particularly 
regional stabilization, information production, and insuring equal credit opportunity, require 
a substantial FHA presence in national mortgage markets. They require a large and vigorous 
FHA, even if that means substantial competition between FHA and conventional mortgage 
lending. Based on this, we believe that FHA's market share likely will be higher in the new 
millennium than it was at the close ofthe last one. 
This discussion has attempted to project what FHA will be asked to do in the new millennium 
rather than how it will be organized. Suggestions for FHA's future include retaining its cur-
rent location within HUD, returning to independent agency status, privatization with or 
without GSE status, or even elimination. The standard response is that these choices likely 
will depend on the purposes that are given for having an FHA, purposes that have been dis-
cussed here. However, it appears to us that any reorganization, short of full privatization or 
elimination, is generally compatible with the bulk ofthe purposes that have been identified. 
We conclude that the purposes likely to be assigned to FHA are fairly clear and that there 
is a need for a substantial FHA market share, but the organizational form for the new mil-
lennium is very much in doubt. 
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